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s scholars of women’s
religious communities
and female religiosity
have often noted, over the
course of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, church
authorities sought to limit
women’s religious options
through increasingly strict
legislation. Citing church
decrees concerning nuns and
beguines, such as Pope Boniface
VIII’s Periculoso (1298) and the
Clementine decrees Ad Nostrum
and Cum de Quibusdam
(1317), several studies have
argued that the later Middle
Ages was a period of growing
hostility towards unregulated
expressions of female religiosity.
While scholars have regarded
these decrees as important
indicators of religious women’s
troubled relationship with the
institutional Church, Elizabeth
Makowski’s new book is the
first in-depth examination
of canonical commentary on
the Clementine decrees and
other legislation targeting
quasi-religious women. In this
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valuable contribution to the
study of women’s extra-religious
communities, Makowski
contends that, though canonists
tended to interpret legislation
concerning secular canonesses
and beguines harshly, this
same group of men tended to
recognize the legitimacy of
quasi-religious communties
in cases brought before the
canon law courts. The author’s
discussion of this gap between
legal interpretations and practice
offers a fresh perspective on
attitudes toward quasi-religious
women and the extent to
which these attitudes limited
opportunities for women to live
as quasi-religious.

A

One of the strengths of
Makowski’s book is its
thorough discussion of the
difficulties medieval lawyers
experienced clarifying the
legal status of quasi-religious
women. Definitions of what
it meant to live a religious life
were of central importance to
canonists wishing to determine
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the protections and privileges
to which quasi-religious women
were entitled. While some
medieval thinkers advocated
a broader definition of the
“religious life,” one based more
on personal comportment than
on membership in a particular
order, by the beginning of
the fourteenth century canon
law had defined the religious
person, in the strict sense, as
one who took vows of poverty,
chastity, and obedience and
had made profession in an
approved order. For canon
lawyers, categorization as
“religious” or “secular” depended
upon the fulfillment of these
requirements. Thus, canonists
defined canonesses, beguines,
and tertiaries as “quasi-religious”
since they did not meet all of
the requirements established
by canon law to be defined
as “truly” religious in the
legal sense. The ambiguous
status of these groups vexed
canonists. Because canonists
found themselves deciding
or commenting upon cases
determining the privileges of
quasi-religious groups, they
were particularly concerned
with the legal implications of
their status.

Part One discusses decrees
targeting canonesses,
beguines, and tertiaries on
which canonists composed
commentary. Referring to the
same decrees, canonical glosses,
and supporting documents in
their writings, canonists often
likened secular canonesses
to beguines. Without fail,
canonists insisted that, though
these women were the subject
of legislation and regulation,
such attention did not imply
approval of their status. The
issue for many canonists was
not only the way canonesses and
beguines blurred distinctions
between “religious” and
“secular” but also how their
way of life seemed calculated
to deceive observers. For these
commentators, by wearing a
distinctive habit and living
in common, canonesses and
beguines attempted to imitate
the “true” religious life and
consequently deceive observers
into believing that they were
religious in the strict canonical
sense of the word.
Despite the oft-cited “escape
clause” in the Vienne decree
Cum de Quibusdam, which
vaguely exempted “faithful
women living uprightly in
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their own lodgings” from the
condemnation the remainder
of the decree implied, most
canonists interpreted Cum de
Quibusdam as an unequivocal
condemnation of the beguine
status. Indeed, Makowski
demonstrates that canonists
interpreted Cum de Quibusdam
far more negatively and applied
it more broadly than its authors
originally intended. This point
may come as no surprise to
scholars familiar with accounts
of the local persecutions
of beguine communities
after the publication of the
Vienne decrees. Nevertheless,
Makowski’s observation that
canonists, many of whom
had no first-hand knowledge
of beguine communities in
Northern Europe, tended to
adopt such strongly unfavorable
opinions towards both
canonesses and beguines sheds
additional light on official
reactions to the Council of
Vienne’s most famous decree.

recent scholarship on German
beguines and tertiaries, which
demonstrates that local
observers recognized almost no
difference between the lifestyles
and communal organization of
beguines and tertiaries and often
employed the terms “tertiary”
and “beguine” interchangeably.
In their commentaries on
Cum de Quibusdam, however,
canonists were careful to
point out that tertiaries were
not to be confused with
beguines and were therefore
not subject to the “blanket
condemnation” they believed
the decree expressed. While
the author does not explore
this disjunction between local
and canonical understandings
of these two groups, she
demonstrates that the care with
which canonists differentiated
between beguines and tertiaries
can be partially attributed to the
fact that the tertiaries’ status,
unlike that of canonesses and
beguines, was papally approved.
This distinction clarified and
validated the tertiaries’ status
in the eyes of the juridicallyminded commentators.

Despite their negative
assessments of canonesses and
beguines, canonists consistently
supported tertiaries, who they
were careful to differentiate
from beguines. This insistence
is significant in light of

Makowski is not only interested
in how canonists interpreted
legislation concerning quasi139
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religious women, she also seeks
to determine how canonists
applied such legislation in the
courts. Part Two, which draws
on concilia (legal opinions) and
decisiones of the Roman Rota,
serves to contrast the legal
theories presented in Part One
with practice, as presented in
court cases involving quasireligious communities. Here,
Makowski demonstrates
that, while canonists severely
interpreted church legislation
concerning canonesses and
beguines, in several court
cases, they defended and even
extended greater ecclesiastical
privileges to certain quasireligious communities. While
the ambiguous status of
quasi-women clearly troubled
canonists, the author deftly
shows that this ambiguity
allowed for some flexibility
when determining the rights
to which such women were
entitled.

did not necessarily signify an
unmitigated attack on women’s
communities. Ultimately,
however, it seems that medieval
lawyers adopted a more flexible
stance towards certain categories
of semi-religious women and
not others. Makowski notes in
her conclusion that negative
commentary regarding the
beguine status adversely affected
the women who chose this
life. Beguines in many towns
in Northern Europe opted
to become tertiaries, a status
that afforded women greater
protection, as evidenced by
the favorable light in which
canonists regarded the Third
Order of St. Francis. Thus,
canonical literature seems to
have impacted beguines more
negatively than other groups
of semi-religious women.
Makowski provides only one
example of how medieval legal
commentaries on beguines were
applied in practice, however.
This particular case was decided
in favor of an unidentified
beguine community (more
details on the case, if available,
would have been welcome),
revealing that not all canonists
were hostile to the beguine
status. Given Makowski’s
strong argument for the ways

Makowski’s comparison of
legal theory and its application
effectively complicates the
scholarly narrative on women’s
religious communities by
showing that fourteenthcentury legislation directed
at quasi-religious women
140
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in which canonists’ opinions
impacted the lives of semireligious women, both favorably
and unfavorably, a few more
examples demonstrating how
these commentaries did or did
not factor into jurists’ decisions
would have shed more light
on canonists’ views on this
particularly vulnerable group of
quasi-religious women.

book will prove useful to
scholars interested in canon
law, religious women, and
the relationship between legal
theory and practice.
Tanya Stabler
University of California, Santa
Barbara

Nevertheless, Makowski’s book
presents a new perspective
on official understandings of
quasi-religious women that
suggests intriguing avenues
for future research. Canonists’
comparisons of beguines and
canonesses reiterate older
theories about the origins
of the beguine movement.
Moreover, Makowski’s findings
concerning the links between
communities of tertiaries and
beguines in Northern Europe, a
connection only touched upon
in a handful of studies, should
inspire further investigation into
these connections. Makowski
briefly discusses these avenues
in the final part of the book,
which summarizes medieval
lawyers’ views on quasi-religious
women and the implications
of these views for modern
scholars. Overall, Makowski’s

in which canonists’ opinions
impacted the lives of semireligious women, both favorably
and unfavorably, a few more
examples demonstrating how
these commentaries did or did
not factor into jurists’ decisions
would have shed more light
on canonists’ views on this
particularly vulnerable group of
quasi-religious women.

book will prove useful to
scholars interested in canon
law, religious women, and
the relationship between legal
theory and practice.
Tanya Stabler
University of California, Santa
Barbara

Nevertheless, Makowski’s book
presents a new perspective
on official understandings of
quasi-religious women that
suggests intriguing avenues
for future research. Canonists’
comparisons of beguines and
canonesses reiterate older
theories about the origins
of the beguine movement.
Moreover, Makowski’s findings
concerning the links between
communities of tertiaries and
beguines in Northern Europe, a
connection only touched upon
in a handful of studies, should
inspire further investigation into
these connections. Makowski
briefly discusses these avenues
in the final part of the book,
which summarizes medieval
lawyers’ views on quasi-religious
women and the implications
of these views for modern
scholars. Overall, Makowski’s
141

141

